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SCRIBBLE SCRABBLE, THE SECOND AMENDMENT, 
AND HISTORICAL GUIDEPOSTS: A SHORT 
REPLY TO LAWRENCE ROSENTHAL AND 
JOYCE LEE MALCOLM 
Patrick J. Charles* 
In a recent article Professors Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Mal-
colm provided an intriguing debate1 over the standard of scrutiny that 
should be applied to restrictions on the Second Amendment in the wake of 
McDonald v. City of Chicago.2  This Article sets forth to illuminate two as-
pects of that debate.  The first is Professor Rosenthal‘s concern on the con-
stitutionality of open-carry or conceal-carry prohibitions.  He inaccurately 
claims that the founders left insufficient historical evidence to support such 
prohibitions.3  Thus this Article addresses those concerns through the use of 
―historical guideposts.‖4  The second aspect this Article sets forth to address 
is Rosenthal and Malcolm‘s characterization of the Second Amendment‘s 
―well-regulated militia‖ language,5 for it highlights a historical and legal er-
ror that continues to pollute contemporary Second Amendment jurispru-
dence.  As this Article will explain, a ―well-regulated militia‖ does not 
 
 
 
*
  Patrick J. Charles is the author of numerous articles on the Second Amendment, and his book en-
titled THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE 
SUPREME COURT (2009) was cited by Justice Breyer in the McDonald dissent.  Mr. Charles is the reci-
pient of the 2008 Judge John R. Brown Award for his research on the Second Amendment and states‘ 
―bear arms‖ provisions, received his J.D. from Cleveland-Marshall School of Law, and his B.A. in His-
tory and International Affairs from the George Washington University.  He is currently an independent 
legal consultant on historical, immigration, and constitutional matters, and is a historian for the United 
States Air Force stationed at Mildenhall, UK.  The opinions expressed in this article are not those of the 
United States Air Force or the Department of Defense, and are solely those of the author. 
1
  See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. City of Chicago: Which Standard of 
Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 85 (2010), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/24/LRColl2010n24Rosenthal&Malcom.pdf 
(link). 
2
  130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (link). 
3
  See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 88. 
4
  Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald: “Historical Gui-
deposts” and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2010 AKRON J. CONST. L. & 
POL‘Y 7 (2010), http://www.akronconlawjournal.com/articles/patrick-charles.pdf (link). 
5
  See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 91–94, 106, 113–14. 
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merely equate to ―well-trained,‖6 nor is it a vehicle to analyze gun control 
regulations7 in the constraints of the opinion in District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler.8 
I. SCRIBBLE SCRABBLE REDUX: HISTORICAL GUIDEPOSTS, THE 
PUBLIC GOOD, AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
As Professor Rosenthal astutely points out,9 the Heller Court has re-
ceived much criticism for its classification of long standing prohibitions.10  
He then poses the question as to whether Heller‘s presumptively lawful 
prohibitions will ―one day be discarded as inconsistent with the original 
meaning of the Second Amendment,‖ for ―[f]raming-era practice appears to 
be of little help.‖11  Indeed, the Heller Court painted with a broad stroke 
what constitutes a ―presumptively lawful‖ firearm regulation.12  However, it 
is improper to claim that the Founding Fathers did not provide us with some 
guidance as to whether a challenged regulation falls within the constitution-
al restraints of the Second Amendment.13 
What we today refer to as gun control is not a twentieth century phe-
nomenon.  Since the Norman Conquest, restrictions began appearing on the 
carrying or using of ―arms‖ as a means to prevent public injury.  King Al-
fred had restrictions on the drawing of any weapon ―in the king‘s hall‖14 and 
the improperly carrying of a spear as to prevent injury.15  In 1328, King 
Edward III implemented restrictions on riding or going armed in public 
places or in the presence of government officials.16  In 1542, King Henry 
VIII placed a prohibition on ―little short handguns, and little hagbuts,‖ 
which were a ―great peril and continual fear and danger of the Kings loving 
subjects.‖17  Likewise, in 1787 the Pennsylvania Minority Dissent, which 
was comprised of those members of the Pennsylvania Constitution Conven-
 
 
 
6
  Compare id. at 106, with Patrick J. Charles, The Constitutional Significance of a “Well-Regulated 
Militia” Asserted and Proven With Commentary on the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 
3 NORTHEASTERN L.J. 1, 2–85 (forthcoming 2011). 
7
  Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 91–94. 
8
  128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (link). 
9
  Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 91–92. 
10
  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17. 
11
  Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 92. 
12
  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17 & n.26. 
13
  See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 91–92 (―Commentators have suggested that the Court 
took a categorical approach in which ‗core‘ Second Amendment interests receive something close to ab-
solute protection, while more penumbral interests are subject to greater regulation.  Still, it is far from 
clear how to go about determining whether a challenged regulation implicates only penumbral interests.  
Framing-era practice appears to be of little help.‖). 
14
  THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 69 (F.L. Attenborough ed., 1922). 
15
  Id. at 79–81. 
16
  2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.) (link). 
17
  33 Hen. 8, c. 6, § 1 (1541) (Eng.). 
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tion that voted against ratifying the Constitution due to the lack of a Bill of 
Rights, acknowledged it was lawful to disarm individuals for ―crimes com-
mitted‖ or when the legislature determined there may be ―real danger of 
public injury from individuals.‖18 
What this brief overview reveals is that ―arms‖ regulations to preserve 
the peace, as well as prevent public injury, are part of our Anglo-American 
tradition.  Whether there is a perfect eighteenth century parallel to modern 
gun control regulations is not the appropriate question that jurists should 
examine when determining whether Second Amendment challenges are 
consistent with framing-era practice.19  For with the advancement of firearm 
technology, especially the portability, firing rate, and power by which mod-
ern firearms operate, it is the rare occurrence that a modern gun control reg-
ulation will mirror an eighteenth century restriction.20 
Therefore, the proper question jurists should ask when examining the 
historical acceptance of modern gun control regulations is whether the regu-
lation would be ―publicly accepted‖ in the framing era.  In other words, the 
question is whether the founders would have accepted the restriction as ne-
cessary to prevent ―public injury‖ or as in the interest of the ―public 
good.‖21  This question is answered by examining the ideological and philo-
sophical origins of gun control, not by finding an exact eighteenth century 
parallel.  While one may argue this form of judicial inquiry resembles Jus-
tice Breyer‘s interest-balancing approach in a historical form,22 the fact of 
the matter is that the entire purpose of the Second Amendment was the fur-
therance of the ―public good.‖23  This holds true whether one examines the 
―right to keep and bear arms‖ in either the constraints of the Heller right to 
self-defense of the home or as a militia right to take part in the common de-
fense.24 
 
 
 
18
  The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylva-
nia, to Their Constituents, PENN. PACKET, AND DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, at 1 (link). 
19
  For a variance of approaches in examining the historical pedigree of modern gun-control regula-
tions with the framing, see United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26508, at 
*13–20 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2010) (following the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. 
Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009)) (link); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(looking first to nineteenth century state laws imposing similar restrictions as the Heller Court did) 
(link); United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated by reh’g en banc, 614 
F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (link); and United States v. Brown, 715 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695–99 (E.D. Va. 
2010) (discussing the history of the arms restrictions at the founding). 
20
  Charles, supra note 4, at 13, 15, 38. 
21
  Id. at 33–39. 
22
  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
23
  Charles, supra note 6, at 74–75. 
24
  See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 650 (1929) (link); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 
252, 267–68 (1886) (link). 
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To illustrate this point, this Article will examine a 1786–87 editorial 
debate over the constitutionality of the Portland Convention.25  The Conven-
tion was an assemblage of Maine counties that discussed a separation from 
Massachusetts.26  Although the Convention sought to exercise legal means 
to form an independent Maine, the Convention raised suspicions of another 
rebellion like Shays‘ Rebellion, which was taking place at the same time.27  
Illegal assemblages of armed men were shutting down courthouses 
throughout Massachusetts, leaving much uncertainty as to the future of the 
new American Republic.28 
The debate began with an editorial penned by the anonymous Senex.  
He described the different assemblages as ―mere mobs‖ in violation of the 
1780 Massachusetts Constitution.29  In particular, Senex thought these as-
semblages violated Articles VII and XIX of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.  Article VII embodied William Blackstone‘s right of governmen-
tal self-preservation,30 while Article XIX was a First Amendment predeces-
sor.31 
Although there was no Massachusetts statute stating these independent 
assemblages were unlawful, Senex asserted they were ―evil and danger-
ous—subversive of all order, peace, or security.‖32  He viewed these ―Coun-
ty Mobs‖ as violating the law because Articles VII and XIX provided the 
constitutional vehicle to redress grievances.33  In other words, ―the people of 
 
 
 
25
  For previous commentary on this debate, see Saul Cornell, Early American Gun Regulation and 
the Second Amendment: A Closer Look at the Evidence, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 197, 197–98 (2007) 
(link); and Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early 
America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 170–71 (2007) 
(link). 
26
  1 WILLIAM WILLIS, THE HISTORY OF PORTLAND, FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT: WITH NOTICES 
OF THE NEIGHBORING TOWNS, AND OF THE CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT IN MAINE 253–56 (Portland, 
Me., Day, Fraser & Co., 1831) (link). 
27
  Id. 
28
  See PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY 
THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 43–44, 83–87 (2009). 
29
  Senex, Shades of Retirement, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Sept. 21, 1786, at 2. 
30
  MASS. CONST. OF 1780, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. VII (―[T]he people alone have an incon-
testible, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally 
change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it.‖) (link).  For a histo-
ry of Blackstone‘s right of self-preservation and resistance, see Patrick J. Charles, The Right of Self-
Preservation and Resistance: A True Legal and Historical Understanding of the English-American 
Right to Arms, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 18 (2010), 
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=132:charles2010
18&catid=20:firearmsinc&Itemid=20 (link). 
31
  MASS. CONST. OF 1780, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIX (stating that ―[t]he people have a 
right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good; give instruc-
tions to their representatives; and to request the legislative body, by way of addresses, petitions, or re-
monstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.‖). 
32
  Senex, supra note 29. 
33
  Id. 
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each town [must] follow the dictates of their invaluable Constitution, by 
remonstrances to the legislature, and instructions to their several representa-
tives.‖34  Any other method of redress would advance ―anarchy and confu-
sion so incident to mobs and conventions.‖35 
Under the penname Scribble Scrabble, Judge George Thatcher, a 
member of the First United States Congress, responded to Senex‘s broad 
classification of lawful conventions as mobs.36  Also a member of the Port-
land Convention, Thatcher separated the Convention from unlawful assem-
blies like the Shays‘ insurgents on the grounds that the former ―thought 
they were discharging their duty in a legal way.‖37  It is here that the ex-
change between Senex and Thatcher turned to the rules of constitutional in-
terpretation.  Senex‘s response was one of strict construction.  He believed 
that if the Declaration of Rights grants the mode to redress injuries, only 
through that constitutional vehicle may the people ―request (or even de-
mand)‖ such injuries be resolved.38  In contrast, Thatcher interpreted the 
Declaration of Rights as a social compact with legislative constitutional 
limits.  To Thatcher, the Declaration was not the totality of the people‘s 
rights, but a list of rights that the government could never usurp. 
Thatcher‘s main problem with Senex‘s interpretation was grouping the 
Shays‘ insurgents, who were unlawfully armed and rebelling against the 
laws of Massachusetts, with the peaceful Portland Convention that was 
seeking ―[e]nquiry and information‖ to erect themselves into a govern-
ment.39  Thatcher elaborated: 
 
In one county the people meet in a Convention to collect 
the sentiments of the people, and lay them before the Gen-
eral Court.  In another they assemble in town meetings, and 
consult upon the public good.  In some counties the people 
assemble in bodies, and with force and arms, prevent the 
Courts of Justice sitting according to law. . . .  When we 
consider the late Portland Convention, as to its constitution 
and to its end, it appears to me essentially different from 
the meetings of the people in some of the western coun-
ties . . . .40 
 
 
 
 
34
  Id. 
35
  Id. 
36
  See Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Criti-
que, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 161 (2007) (link). 
37
  Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Oct. 5, 1786, at 2 (emphasis added). 
38
  Senex, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Oct. 19, 1786, at 2. 
39
  Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Nov. 2, 1786, at 1. 
40
  Id. (emphasis added). 
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Thatcher‘s reference to the ―public good‖ is of constitutional signific-
ance, for it was the entire basis by which eighteenth century lawmaking and 
constitutional interpretation was premised.41  Most importantly, for the pur-
poses of this Article, the reference to the ―public good‖ is a premise that 
Thatcher would use to explain the ―right to keep and bear arms‖ in the 1780 
Massachusetts Constitution.  Thatcher‘s basis for examining the constitu-
tional restraints on the use of arms was to illustrate the impropriety of Se-
nex‘s limited interpretation of the Declaration of Rights.  In Thatcher‘s 
words: ―[W]here the declaration secures a particular right, in itself aliena-
ble, or the use of a right, in the people, it does not at the same time contain, 
by implication, a negative of any other use of that right.‖42 
For instance, Article XVII of the 1780 Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights states, ―The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the 
common defence . . . and the military power shall always be held in an ex-
act subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.‖43  Thatcher 
interpreted this provision as not prohibiting the people from ―using arms for 
other purposes than common defence.‖44  Thatcher reasoned that because 
Article XVII ―does not contain a negative,‖ ―the people have the full uncon-
trouled use of arms, as much as though the Declaration had been silent upon 
that head.‖45 
Thatcher was not claiming that Article XVII affords an unalienable 
right to arms for whatever purpose.  He viewed the use of arms for other 
purposes as an ―alienable right‖ that the legislature has the ―power to con-
troul‖ in ―all cases . . . whenever they shall think the good of the whole re-
quire it.‖46  However, Thatcher was arguing the Declaration recognizes core 
―rights and privileges‖ that are ―esteemed essential to the very being of so-
ciety; and therefore guarded, by being declared such, and prefixed to the 
constitution as a memento that they are never to be infringed.‖47  To paraph-
rase, Thatcher viewed the Declaration of Rights as embodying a constitu-
tional bottom upon which the legislature could never infringe.  In the case 
of Article XVII this meant the Massachusetts Assembly could never de-
 
 
 
41
  See 2 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, AGAINST THE ATTACK OF M. TURGOT IN HIS LETTER TO DR. PRICE, DATED THE 
TWENTY-SECOND DAY OF MARCH, 1778 30 (Gale 2010) (1794) (tracing the origins of the concept of the 
―public good‖ to Machiavelli); Samuel Adams, Mass. Lt. Gov., Speech to the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives and Senate (Jan. 17, 1794), in RESOLVES OF THE GENERAL COURT OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 33, 34 (1794) (―It is therein declared, that Government is insti-
tuted for the common good; not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class 
of men.‖); see also infra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the ―public good‖ in lawmaking 
and constitutionalism). 
42
  Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Dec. 8, 1786, at 1. 
43
  MASS. CONST. OF 1780, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII. 
44
  Scribble Scrabble, supra note 42. 
45
  Id. 
46
  Id. (emphasis added). 
47
  Id. 
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prive the people from participating in the ―common defence.‖  On the other 
hand, all other uses of arms were alienable and could be ―abridged by the 
legislature as they may think for the general good.‖48 
On January 12, 1787, Senex replied to Thatcher‘s interpretation of the 
Declaration of Rights.  He feared that Thatcher was inferring that the gener-
al people had a right to abolish, separate, and reform government as seen 
fit.49  Senex would turn Thatcher‘s argument on its head.  He argued if Ar-
ticle VII ―contains no negative,‖ there was ―no reason why [the people] 
have not this right‖ to ―reform, alter, or totally change their government‖ 
―even when the safety does not require it.‖50  Senex applied the same rea-
soning to Thatcher‘s interpretation of Article XVII, stating: 
 
The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the 
common defence.  Have they a right to bear arms against 
the common defence?  According to the gentleman‘s rea-
soning, I answer yes; for to say a man has a certain right, 
and that he is not denied any other use of the right, is most 
assuredly saying that he possesses that right for every pur-
pose.51 
 
Here, Senex revealed a fatal philosophical flaw in Thatcher‘s interpre-
tation of Article XVII.  By the late eighteenth century, it was well-settled 
that it was a dangerous idea to interpret the ―right to keep and bear arms‖ as 
including a right to revolt.52  Such an interpretation ran afoul of the constitu-
tional restraints placed on the right since its inception in the 1689 English 
Declaration of Rights.53 
 
 
 
48
  Id. (emphasis added). 
49
  The Massachusetts Assembly would clarify this matter by passing a statute that made it only law-
ful to ―bear arms for the common defence‖: 
 
Whereas in a free government, where the people have a right to bear arms for the 
common defence, and the military power is held in subordination to the civil au-
thority, it is necessary for the safety of the State, that the virtuous citizens thereof 
should hold themselves in readiness, and when called upon, should exert their ef-
forts to support the civil government, and oppose attempts of factious and wicked 
men, who may wish to subvert the laws and constitution of their country. 
 
Act of Feb. 20, 1787, ch. 9, 1787 Mass. Laws 564 (providing for the ―more speedy and effec-
tual suppression of Tumults and Insurrections in the Commonwealth‖). 
50
  Senex, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Jan. 12, 1787, at 1. 
51
  Id. 
52
  Charles, supra note 30, at 32–35, 44–59. 
53
  See Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence?”: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of 
the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in McDo-
nald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 421–54 (2009) (discussing the American understand-
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However, it seems that Senex was missing the thrust of Thatcher‘s ar-
gument.  At no point in his previous editorials did Thatcher advocate the 
lawfulness of armed rebellion; he actually denounced such behavior as ―es-
sentially different‖54 and not seeking a redress of grievances ―in a legal 
way.‖55 
To clarify his stance, Thatcher offered the following response: 
 
The right to reform or alter government, is not created by 
the Bill of Rights . . . [it] is a right independent of the Bill 
of Rights, and exists in the people anterior to their forming 
themselves into government . . . .  Senex asks if the people 
have a right to bear arms against the common defence?  I 
answer, that whatever right people had to use arms in a 
state of nature, they retain at the present time, notwith-
standing the 17th article of the Bill of Rights.56 
 
Thatcher‘s response clarifies that he was articulating the right of go-
vernmental self-preservation or what Blackstone deemed the ―fifth auxiliary 
right.‖57  He understood that once a civil compact is created, the people 
―surrender a certain portion of their alienable rights; or rather, to vest in cer-
tain persons, a power to make laws for, and controul the alienable rights of, 
the whole.‖58  At the same time though, should the government fail to pro-
duce the ―end of government,‖ i.e. the ―happiness of the people,‖ the 
people, through their representatives, retain the power to reform or alter 
government.59 
Thatcher elaborated on this point in a subsequent editorial, writing: 
 
The right to institute government, and the right to alter and 
change a bad government, I call the same right: I see no 
difference between them.  The end of this right is the great-
est happiness of the greatest number of the people; and the 
means or object made use of, is government.  This right I 
                                                                                                                           
ing of this provision) (link); Charles, supra note 30, at 24–60 (discussing the legal restraints on Black-
stone‘s fifth auxiliary right). 
54
  Scribble Scrabble, supra note 39, at 2. 
55
  Scribble Scrabble, supra note 37, at 2. 
56
  Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Jan. 26, 1787, at 1. 
57
  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139 (―The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, 
that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defense, suitable to their condition and 
degree, and such as are allowed by law.  Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. & M. st. 2 c. 2. 
and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of 
oppression.‖) (link). 
58
  Scribble Scrabble, supra note 56, at 1. 
59
  Id. 
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understand to be a physical power, under the direction of 
reason, to bring about this happiness.  Therefore, when the 
people have agreed upon a certain set of rules, which they 
denominate government . . . they are binding, on the pre-
sumption that they will produce the degree of happiness be-
fore mentioned . . . .  It is not the existence of government, 
or any agreement contained therein, that gives the people a 
right to destroy it when it does not answer the end for 
which it was instituted.  The existence of a bad government 
only affords an opportunity for this right . . . to come into 
exercise.60 
 
In its entirety, the Senex and Thatcher debate reveals much on consti-
tutional interpretation, especially the founding generation‘s views on the 
―right to keep and bear arms.‖  Although the 1780 Massachusetts Constitu-
tion only guaranteed the right for the ―common defence,‖61 Thatcher re-
minds us that this does not foreclose other uses of arms for lawful purposes.  
As Thatcher stated in his penultimate editorial to Senex: 
 
The question is not, whether two persons can have an ex-
clusive right to the same thing, at one and the same time: 
but, whether the bill of rights, by securing to the people a 
right originally in them [in a state of nature] . . . thereby 
prohibits them the other uses of that right, which they also 
had originally a right to.62 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Senex and Thatcher debate is 
that it gives historical credence to the argument that only the ―core‖ of the 
Second Amendment should receive elevated protection.  Meanwhile, any 
interests that fall outside of this ―core‖ should be given minimized protec-
tions,63 especially if they fall within the accepted ideological and philosoph-
ical restraints as the founders understood.64 
Thatcher illustrated this legal concept many times over.65  He unders-
tood that the Bill of Rights imposes constitutional limits on the legislature.  
In the case of Article XVII this meant that the ―right to keep and bear arms 
for the common defence‖ was ―prefixed to the constitution‖ and was ―never 
 
 
 
60
  Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Mar. 23, 1787, at 4. 
61
  MASS. CONST. OF 1780, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XVII. 
62
  Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Mar. 16, 1787, at 4. 
63
  See United States v. Chester, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26508, at *24–26 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2010);  
see also Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 
976–77 (2009) (link). 
64
  For a working analysis of this historical approach, see Charles, supra note 4, at 14–30. 
65
  See supra note 52and accompanying text. 
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to be infringed.‖66  Meanwhile, all other uses of arms were ―alienable 
right[s]‖ and could be ―abridged by the legislature as they may think for the 
general good.‖67 
If one applies Thatcher‘s concept of the ―public good‖ to contemporary 
gun control laws, Professor Rosenthal‘s concerns about the constitutionality 
of open-carry and conceal-carry restrictions are alleviated, and Heller‘s 
classification of such prohibitions as ―presumptively lawful‖68 is ideologi-
cally supported in history.  While legal commentators may claim that there 
is little, if any, historical evidence to support the proposition that the fra-
mers would have agreed to open-carry or conceal-carry prohibitions,69 they 
do so without understanding the ideological origins of gun control.70 
It is common practice for legal commentators to envision the framing 
era as a utopia that casted off our Anglo and international origins to start 
anew.71  However, such broad assertions fail to take into account that the 
framers were much attuned to English and international precedent.  For in-
stance, Associate Justice Samuel Chase kept a journal compiling all the 
British case law still in force within the United States,72 John Marshall used 
the treatises of Hugo Grotius, William Blackstone, and Emer de Vattel to 
 
 
 
66
  Scribble Scrabble, supra note 42. 
67
  Id. 
68
  District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 n.26 (2008) (discussing limitations on car-
rying weapons on ―sensitive places‖). 
69
  See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analyt-
ical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1480–81, 1516–29 (2009) (link) [he-
reinafter Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms]; Eugene Volokh, The First and 
Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 101–02 (2009), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/the-first-and-second-amendments (link) [hereinafter Volokh, 
The First and Second Amendments]. 
70
  Discarding the philosophical and ideological origins of gun control also runs afoul of the Heller 
and McDonald opinions.  See Charles, supra note 4, at 21–30. 
71
  For example, for over a century legal commentators have asserted that the Supreme Court created 
the Plenary Power Doctrine over aliens, citizenship, foreign affairs, and naturalization.  See, e.g., L. 
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Prog-
eny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858–63 (1987) (describing Supreme Court cases expanding the federal 
government‘s powers over immigration) (link); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of 
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550–
60 (1990) (detailing the development and contours of the Plenary Power Doctrine) (link).  However, the 
Plenary Power Doctrine is deeply rooted in the Anglo-American tradition and was acknowledged as 
such by all the prominent constitutional commentators in the late eighteenth century.  See Patrick J. 
Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusion: A Historical 
Perspective, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 61, 67–91 (2010) (link). 
72
  See Samuel Chase, British Case Law Citations (1800) (unpublished journal, on file with the Li-
brary of Congress Rare Books Division, Washington, D.C.). 
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argue cases,73 and some states adopted English statutes in their entirety even 
after Independence.74 
This latter point is of particular significance in understanding the con-
stitutionality of open-carry or conceal-carry prohibitions.  In 1328, King 
Edward III and Parliament implemented the Statute of Northampton, mak-
ing it unlawful ―to go nor ride armed by Night nor by Day in Fairs, Mar-
kets, nor in the Presence of the Justices or other Ministers nor in no Part 
elsewhere.‖75  The Statute remained in force in the states of Massachusetts, 
North Carolina, and Virginia even after the adoption of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.76  In the case of North Carolina, the statute read almost verbatim by 
prohibiting riding armed ―by night nor by day, in fairs, markets, nor in the 
presence of the King‘s Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part else-
where.‖77 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Statute of Northampton is that 
it contains no intent requirement for the conduct to be otherwise unlawful.78  
One merely had to go or ride armed in ―fairs, markets,‖ or other populated 
enclaves.  The same was true for the 1285 statute of Edward I, which made 
it unlawful to go or wander ―about the Streets‖ of London, ―after Curfew 
tolled . . . with Sword or Buckler, or other Arms for doing Mischief . . . nor 
any in any other Manner, unless he be a great Man or other lawful Person 
of good repute[.]‖79  It was not until 1350 that there was any mention of an 
 
 
 
73
  See James Iredell, Middle Circuit, 1793, Virginia 4, 5–6 (1793) (unpublished journal of oral ar-
guments) (on file with the Library of Congress Rare Books Division, Washington, D.C.). 
74
  For example, Maryland adopted and maintained the English common law and much of the statu-
tory structure when it adopted its Constitution, following the Declaration of Independence.  See MD. 
CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. III (link).  Cf. Tench Coxe, An Examination of the Con-
stitution for  the United States (1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1778–1788, at 133, 137 (Paul Leicester 
Ford ed., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2009) (1888) (discussing the United States‘ connection with its 
English origins, Coxe wrote, ―we did not dissolve our connection with [England] so much on account of 
its constitution as the perversion and maladministration of it.‖) (link). 
75
  2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.); see also 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.) (―[If] any Man of 
this Realm ride armed covertly or secretly with Men of Arms against any other . . . it shall be judged 
Treason‖); 1 Jac.1, c. 8 (1603–04) (Eng.) (also known as the Statute of Stabbing). 
76
  See 2 THE PERPETUAL LAWS, OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, FROM THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF ITS CONSTITUTION TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL COURT, IN 1798, at 
259 (Worcester, Isaiah Thomas 1799) (confirming that no person ―shall ride or go armed offensively, to 
the fear or terror of the good citizens of this Commonwealth‖); FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, A 
COLLECTION OF STATUTES OF THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF NORTH 
CAROLINA 60–61 (Newbern 1792) (confirming that no person may ―go nor ride armed by night nor by 
day, in fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the King‘s Justices, or other ministers, nor in no part else-
where‖); A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, OF PUBLIC AND 
PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE 33 (Augustine Davis 1794) (confirming that no person may 
go or ride armed by night or day, in fairs, markets, or elsewhere, or in the presence of the Court‘s Justic-
es or other ministers of justice). 
77
  MARTIN, supra note 76, at 61 (emphasis added). 
78
  See 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). 
79
  13 Edw. 1 (1285) (Eng.) (Statutes for the City of London) (emphasis added). 
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intent requirement with going armed, but this statute did not amend or over-
ride the Statute of Northampton.  Instead, it affirmed that it was a separate 
felony for ―any Man of this Realm ride armed covertly or secretly with Men 
of Arms against any other.‖80  Furthermore, the 1350 statute clarified to the 
courts that such malicious intent did not qualify as treason, stating that rid-
ing armed ―covertly or secretly . . . against any other . . . shall be judged [a] 
Felony or Trespass, according to the Laws of the Land of the old Time 
used, and according as the Case requireth.‖81 
But some commentators fail to recognize these legal differences and 
the ideological impetus of such statutes.  For example, the ideological impe-
tus for the Statute of Northampton was the potential danger posed by indi-
viduals going or riding armed, not just preventing malicious intent or the 
possession of dangerous and unusual weapons.  In contrast, Professor Eu-
gene Volokh82 claims the Statute was ―understood by the Framers as cover-
ing only those circumstances where carrying of arms was unusual and 
therefore terrifying.‖83  Quoting William Hawkins‘s Pleas of the Crown, 
Volokh asserts the Statute solely stands for the legal proposition that ―pub-
lic carrying ‗accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to terrify the 
people‘ was . . . seen as prohibited,‖ but ―‗wearing common weapons‘ in 
‗the common fashion‘ was legal.‖84 
However, this assessment of the historical record is misleading.  First, 
Professor Volokh omits that Hawkins was referring to a legal exception for 
persons of ―quality‖ or the nobility‘s right to wear arms and be accompa-
nied with armed escorts.85  Such persons were exempt because they were 
 
 
 
80
  25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.).  Differentiation between the 1350 statute and the Statute 
of Northampton is supported by Coke‘s Institutes.  See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 159–60 (London, E&R Brooke 1797) (showing the ―clause of the sta-
tute 25 E. 3‖ was a treason distinction) (link). 
81
  25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 2, § 13 (1350) (Eng.). 
82
  Briefly addressing Professor Volokh‘s writings on the history of the Second Amendment is sig-
nificant, for it is his opinions on which Professor Rosenthal in part relies.  See Rosenthal & Malcolm, 
supra note 1, at 88. 
83
  Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, supra note 69, at 101. 
84
  Id. at 102 (quoting 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 136, ch. 63, 
§ 9 (photo. reprint 1978) (1716)). 
85
  The full quote to which Volokh refers reads: ―That Persons of Quality are in no Danger of Of-
fending against this Statute by wearing common Weapons, or having their usual Number of Attendants 
with them, for their Ornament or Defence, in such Places, and upon such Occasions, in which it is the 
common Fashion to make use of them, without causing the least Suspicion of an Intention to commit 
any Act of Violence or Disturbance of the Peace.‖  1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF 
THE CROWN 136, ch. 63, § 9 (photo. reprint 1978) (1716) (link).  This law was the exception to the gen-
eral rule that it was unlawful for people to carry arms in public under the auspices of self-defense.  
Hawkins writes: 
 
That a Man cannot excuse the wearing such Armour in Publick, by alledging that 
such a one threatened him, and that he wears it for the Safety of his Person from 
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presumed to be ―in no danger of offending‖ the law, or having ―an intention 
to commit any act of violence, or disturbing of the peace.‖86  This legal pre-
sumption would not have applied to the average subject or citizen.  Not to 
mention, whether an individual was of noble birth did not matter if they 
wore any dangerous ―armour in public, by alledging that such a one threat-
ened him, and that he wears it for the safety of his person from his as-
sault.‖87 
Second, Volokh‘s characterization of the Statute of Northampton as-
sumes Hawkins‘ reference to ―terrify‖ equates with actual intent or conduct 
to do harm with arms.  However, if one takes into account eighteenth cen-
tury restrictions on firearms and the actual text of the Statute, it would be 
presumed that the general carrying of pistols or firearms in populated areas, 
would have qualified as violating the Statute of Northampton.  Take for in-
stance a 1754 charge to the grand jury in London, where an assault was de-
scribed as being committed should a person hold up their fist, ―present[] a 
Gun,‖ or use ―any other Instrument in a threatening Manner, where the Per-
son threatened is within the Reach, or Effect of it.‖88  While one may debate 
what would constitute as ―presenting a Gun,‖ openly carrying a firearm, 
flashing it, or having it loaded (in the eighteenth century this would general-
ly require one physically holding the firearm parallel or upright) does 
―present‖ to others that you pose a potential threat more so than the average 
person.89 
                                                                                                                           
his Assault; but it hath been resolved, That no one shall incur the Penalty of the 
said Statute for assembling his Neighbours and Friends in his own House, against 
those who threaten to do him any Violence therein, because a Man‘s House is as 
his Castle. 
 
Id. at 136, ch. 63, § 8. 
86
  JAMES PARKER, THE CONDUCTOR GENERAL . . . ADAPTED TO THESE UNITED STATES 11 (New 
York, John Patterson 1788) (quoting 1 HAWKINS, supra note 85, at 136, ch. 63, § 9) 
87
  Id. at 11–12. 
88
  CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY 1689–1803, at 385 (Georges Lamoine ed., 1992). 
89
  The limits of eighteenth century firearm technology made it nearly impossible to holster or carry 
a loaded firearm, especially a pistol, but for very short periods.  For the firearm to remain loaded the in-
dividual would have to take great care to carry the pistol upright or parallel to ensure the ball or shot was 
not dislodged and that the powder could be properly charged.  For an overview of eighteenth century 
firearm technology, see WILLIAM E. BURNS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 110–
14 (2005) (link).  For contemporaneous evidence that one would generally have to ―present‖ a loaded 
pistol and that it would have been seen as terrifying, see WILLIAM DUANE, A REPORT OF THE 
EXTRAORDINARY TRANSACTIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE AT PHILADELPHIA, IN FEBRUARY 1799, at 9–10 
(Phila., Office of the Aurora 1799) (The testimony of Lewis Ryan was transcribed as follows: ―He then 
pulled out a pistol and presented it towards the body of J.Gallagher . . . which part of the body, he could 
not expressly say.  I supposed the person who pulled out the pistol to be insulting the congregation by 
some means or other . . . .  I felt very much alarmed at the sight of fire-arms, and I did not know how to 
act in the business, for it was difficult to engage with a man having fire-arms . . . .‖); id. at 43 (In light of 
the evidence, Judge Cox issued the following charge to the jury: ―We do not see [the defendant] as a 
peaceable citizen now.  Where is this good, this quiet man?  [N]o, he has a loaded pistol in his pocket; 
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Third, even assuming Volokh‘s interpretation of the Statute of Nor-
thampton as the correct one, there being a ―dangerous‖ requirement, it 
misses the ideological and philosophical point of the law—preventing pub-
lic injury, ensuring the public peace, and providing for the ―public good.‖90  
Take for instance James Davis‘s 1774 treatise, entitled The Office and Au-
thority of a Justice of the Peace, which stated the Statute stood for the pre-
mise that ―unusual and offensive Weapons‖ were prohibited ―among the 
great Concourse of the People.‖91  While there is room for debate as to what 
weapons would have qualified as ―dangerous,‖ ―unusual,‖ or ―offensive,‖ 
there is substantiated evidence to suggest that loaded firearms and pistols 
qualified in populated areas.  This is supported by eighteenth century ordin-
ances in Boston and Newburyport.  As early as 1746 Boston made it unlaw-
ful for any person to ―discharge any Gun or Pistol charged with Shot or Ball 
in town,‖ including ―any Part of the Harbour between the Castle of said 
Town[.]‖92  This ordinance was reaffirmed in 1768 by the Boston Select-
men, which included John Hancock.93  The ordinance was required because 
―divers of the Inhabitants have been lately surprized and endangered by the 
firing of Muskets charged with Shot or Ball on the Neck, Common, and 
other Parts of the Town[.]‖94  Exceptions in both ordinances were given to 
militia during times of muster.95  However, there were no exceptions for 
personal self-defense.  In 1785, the town of Newburyport, Massachusetts 
adopted a similar provision: 
 
That no person (excepting the militia, when under arms, on 
muster-days, and by command of their officers) shall fire 
off any sort of gun, pistol, squib, cracker or other thing 
charged or composed in whole, or in part of gun-powder, in 
any of the streets, lanes or public ways in this town, nor so 
near thereto as to affright any horse, or in any sort tend to 
affright, annoy or injure any person whatever—nor shall 
any person discharge at a mark or other—wise any gun, 
charged with ball, at any time or front of any place within 
this town, nor in any direction but such only as from time 
                                                                                                                           
thus armed, he throws the gauntlet, by this he invited insult; he puts the whole church at defiance; he 
says come on with you, I am now ready for you.  He seems to have wished to be attack . . . .‖). 
90
  For a great summary of the importance of the ―public good‖ as a legal concept, see DUANE, supra 
note 89, at 21. 
91
  JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 13 (Newbern 1774). 
92
  An Act to Prevent the Firing of Guns Laden with Shot or Ball in the Town of Boston, reprinted in 
BOSTON WEEKLY NEWS-LETTER, Sept. 18, 1746, at 2. 
93
  RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, SELECTMEN‘S MINUTES FROM 1764 
THROUGH 1768, at 307 (Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1889). 
94
  THE BOSTON POST-BOY & ADVERTISER, Sept. 5, 1768, at 1. 
95
  Id.; Act to Prevent the Firing of Guns Laden with Shot or Ball in the Town of Boston, supra note 
92. 
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to time shall be approved of and licensed by the town, or by 
the select-men thereof.96 
 
Indeed, the ordinances said nothing about carrying unloaded firearms, 
but discharging and firing arms in general could be prohibited to protect the 
general welfare.  Let us not forget there is substantial evidence that the 
founding generation viewed the assembling of arms without the authority of 
the government as dangerous to the public peace.  While one may argue that 
prohibiting the carrying of firearms in public, open or concealed, substan-
tially burdens an individual‘s right to personal self-defense,97 such an argu-
ment fails to take into account that the founders sought to prevent public 
injury and limit potential riots, routs, tumults, and assemblages of arms.98  
This includes the Massachusetts Assembly passing such a statute to keep 
the peace from potential dangers like Shays‘ Rebellion.99  These laws were 
premised on what was in the interest of the public good,100 and viewed as 
essential to prevent public injury. 
 
 
 
96
  THE ESSEX JOURNAL AND THE MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW-HAMPSHIRE GENERAL ADVERTISER 
(Newburyport, Mass.), May 11, 1785, at 2. 
97
  See Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 69, at 1516–29. 
98
  For some examples, see Act of Feb. 20, 1787, ch. 9, 1787 Mass. Acts 564; Act of Feb. 24, 1797, 
ch. 637, 1797 N.J. Laws 179; Act of Dec. 20, 1763, ch. 1233, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF 
NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 748–49 (Albany, James B. Lyon, 1894); Act of 
1705, ch. 128, 1705 Pa. Laws 153, reprinted in 1 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
(Phila., J. Bioren 1803) (link). 
99
  On October 26, 1786 the following was passed into law by the Massachusetts Assembly: 
 
That from & after the publication of this act, if any persons, to the number of 
twelve, or more, being armed with clubs or other weapons; or if any number of 
persons, consisting of thirty, or more, shall be unlawfully, routously, rioutously or 
tumultuously assembled, any Justice of the Peace, Sheriff, or Deputy . . . or Con-
stable . . . shall openly make [a] proclamation [asking them to disperse, and if 
they do not disperse within one hour, the officer is] . . . empowered, to require the 
aid of a sufficient number of persons in arms . . . and if any such person or per-
sons [assembled illegally] shall be killed or wounded, by reason of his or their re-
sisting the persons endeavouring to disperse or seize them, the said Justice, 
Sheriff, Deputy-Sheriff, Constable and their assistants, shall be indemnified, and 
held guiltless. 
 
An Act to Prevent Routs, Riots, and Tumultuous Assemblies, and the Evil Consequences 
Thereof, reprinted in CUMBERLAND GAZETTE (Portland, Me.), Nov. 17, 1786, at 1. 
100
  William Blackstone defined the ―public good‖ as ―nothing more essentially interested, than in 
the protection of every individual‘s private rights, as modeled by the municipal law.‖  1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *139 (link).  In other words, ―the legislature alone can, and indeed fre-
quently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce.‖  Id.  Pennsylvania Judge Alexander 
Addison discussed the importance of the ―public good‖ in America‘s constitutional system: 
 
To produce virtue, or public utility, is the true end of government.  Virtue is most 
effectually produced, by making it the interest of each individual, to promote the 
public good.  That form of government must be good, which necessarily combines 
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Thus, although most modern day open-carry and conceal-carry prohibi-
tions do not exactly parallel the Statute of Northampton or other eighteenth 
century firearms laws, their differences do not disparage that the govern-
ment could make it unlawful to ―go . . . armed‖101 in public areas,102 and that 
legislatures must have the power to restrict the use, possession, and opera-
tion of arms for the ―good of the whole.‖103  As Judge George Thatcher elo-
quently put it, unless the Constitution provides an affirmative and 
unalienable guarantee, any other use of arms can be ―abridged by the legis-
lature as they may think for the general good.‖104 
II. A ―WELL-REGULATED‖ PROBLEM: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
PRESERVING THE SECOND AMENDMENT‘S PREFATORY LANGUAGE 
Even before District of Columbia v. Heller, misconceptions of the fra-
mers‘ ―well-regulated militia‖ language polluted modern Second Amend-
ment scholarship.  Advocates for a broad interpretation of the Second 
Amendment asserted the myth that the individual use, ownership, and exer-
cise of ―arms‖ effectuated the constitutional purpose of a ―well-regulated 
militia.‖105  This myth continues to pollute Second Amendment scholarship 
to this day.106 
                                                                                                                           
the individual, with the general, interest; and that form of government must be 
bad, which necessarily disjoins them. That therefore must be the best form of 
government, which most effectually and inseparably combines and unites the 
general and individual interest: and this is most effectually done, in a democratic 
republic. 
 
ALEXANDER ADDISON, CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURIES OF THE COUNTIES OF THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 93 (Wash., John Colerick 1800).  Addison further wrote on 
the importance that legislatures do not give into popular sentiment that deviates from the public good.  
He wrote, ―[If] Officers are . . . seduced, by a love of what is called popularity, to give that kind of flat-
tery to the people . . . in accommodating their conduct to the humour of the day, or the solicitation of the 
applicant,‖ instead of the ―public good,‖ the ―true end of the office, serving the public is perverted into a 
false end, pleasing the public; the duty of the office is betrayed; the constitutional end of the office is 
defeated[.]‖  Id. at 157–58. 
101
  2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.). 
102
  See DAVIS, supra note 91, at 13; MARTIN, supra note 76, at 61; PARKER, supra note 86, at 11–
12. 
103
  Scribble Scrabble, supra note 42. 
104
  Id. 
105
  See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 61–65, 85, 144 (2d ed. 1994); Stephen P. Halbrook, St. George Tucker’s 
Second Amendment: Deconstructing “The True Palladium of Liberty”, 3 TENN. J.L. & POL‘Y 120, 130 
(2007). 
106
  See David T. Hardy, Ducking the Bullet: District of Columbia v. Heller and the Stevens Dissent, 
2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 61, 66–67 (2010) (pointing out this line of argument), 
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=133:hardy20106
1&catid=20:firearmsinc&Itemid=20 (link). 
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But to the founding generation, a ―well-regulated militia‖ indicated 
something far more specific—and far more important—than a well-armed 
citizenry.  A ―well-regulated militia‖ provided constitutional balance and 
united the people in defense of our rights, liberties, and property; to extol 
Machiavelli‘s virtù and unite the people as a common community.107  It was 
a constitutional body of citizens capable of bearing arms where men would 
train together in the Art of War and an esprit de corps would flourish.108  It 
was a body of citizen soldiers professionally disciplined and trained to pre-
vent the establishment of standing armies and to provide a constitutional 
check on the federal government.109 
A ―well-regulated militia‖ was not ―merely . . . well-trained,‖ as Pro-
fessor Malcolm asserts.110  Such a loose definition ignores the rich history of 
Machiavellian influence on the concept of a constitutional militia,111 the de-
tailed seventeenth and eighteenth century tracts on the constitutional signi-
ficance of a ―well-regulated militia,‖112 the inclusion of the institution in 
five state constitutions by 1789,113 and the First and Second Congress de-
bates over the institution when implementing the 1792 National Militia 
Act.114  Furthermore, it makes little sense for the Founding Fathers to have 
toasted to a ―well-regulated militia‖115 and referred to the constitutional 
body as the ―palladium of liberty‖116 if ―well-regulated‖ merely meant 
―well-trained.‖  The fact of the matter is a ―well-regulated militia‖ was seen 
as crucial to the success of a democratic government.117  Upon returning to 
 
 
 
107
  See Charles, supra note 6, at 6–54.  
108
  Id. 
109
  Id. 
110
  Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 1, at 106. 
111
  See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975) (link); J.G.A. Pocock, Machiavelli, Harrington and 
English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 549 (1965). 
112
  Charles, supra note 6, at 6–16. 
113
  DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES art. XVIII (Del. 1776); MD. CONST. of 
1776 art. XXV (link); N.H. CONST. of 1784 art. XXIV (link); N.Y. CONST. of 1777 art. XL (link); 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XIII (Va. 1776). 
114
  See Patrick J. Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, the Second Amendment, and Individual 
Militia Rights: A Legal and Historical Perspective, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y (forthcoming 2011) (ma-
nuscript at 9–40), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705564 (link). 
115
  See Charles, supra note 6, at 50 n. 381, 55. 
116
  Id. at 44–50, 55; Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker’s Lecture Notes, the Second Amendment and 
Originalist Methodology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1541, 1542 (2009), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/13/LRColl2009n13Cornell.pdf (link).  
Some commentators have improperly asserted that the founders viewed ―arms‖ or individual self-
defense as the ―palladium of liberty.‖  See Stephen P. Halbrook, supra note 105; Randy E. Barnett & 
Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1220 
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the Portland Convention, one editorial writer even commented that, should 
Maine form a separate state, it was important for the new government to in-
clude ―a well regulated Militia of the People, between fifteen and forty 
years old; and none to be eligible to any office among them, but such as 
first serve in the ranks.‖118 
I agree with Professor Malcolm‘s dismissal of Professor Rosenthal‘s 
analysis of a ―well-regulated militia.‖119  Indeed, Professor Rosenthal is cor-
rect that the framers envisioned that the states retain ―general regulatory 
power over the possession and carrying of firearms[.]‖120  However, it is a 
historical invention to assert that the Second Amendment‘s preamble in any 
way refers to the general regulation of ―arms,‖ for this understanding of the 
phrase ―well-regulated militia‖ is not at all supported by the historical 
record. 
Professor Rosenthal seems to arrive at his thesis by mistakenly equat-
ing the general people with the unorganized militia.121  But the Second 
Amendment only speaks of the right to ―keep and bear arms‖ in the con-
straints of a ―well-regulated militia,‖ not an unorganized militia.122  Fur-
thermore, Rosenthal conflates the Heller right of individual self-defense in 
the home with that of a ―well-regulated militia‖ right to ―keep and bear 
arms.‖123  The two protections are distinct in both law and history.  As the 
Heller decision makes clear, the issue before the Court was not the constitu-
tional scope of ―keeping and bearing‖ arms to effectuate a ―well-regulated 
militia.‖  Instead, the holding was that the Second Amendment also protects 
the right to use handguns in the home for self-defense.124  It was only this 
narrow holding that the McDonald decision affirmed and incorporated to 
the States, as is evidenced by the hundred-page plurality opinion‘s failure to 
address the phrase ―well-regulated militia.‖ 
To be precise, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Second 
Amendment contains two ―core‖ rights.  The first is the right of ―the 
people‖ to possess handguns for self-defense at home.  Although the 
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Second Amendment does not expressly state this right, the Heller Court de-
termined the right to be the ―central component‖125 due to its Anglo ori-
gins126 and contemporaneous state analogues.127  The second ―core‖ right is 
that of participating in the common defense in a ―well-regulated militia‖ 
force.128  Participation ensured citizens understood and appreciated life, li-
berty, and property, and provided a constitutional counterpoise to standing 
armies by ensuring the people would be dependent upon themselves for the 
national defense.129 
Naturally, the two ―core‖ rights are distinct in what they protect.  The 
―core‖ right to armed individuals‘ self-defense of the home with a handgun 
is divorced from the militia, and falls within the general police power of 
government.  Meanwhile, the ―core‖ right to participate in defending one‘s 
liberties in a ―well-regulated militia‖ is a right intimately connected with 
government.  It is a right severely limited in scope because the federal and 
state governments have concurrent power to arm, organize, and discipline 
the militia, with the state governments possessing plenary authority to train 
the militia.130 
At the same time, however, the two ―core‖ rights are interrelated in 
that both are controlled by what is in the interest of the ―public good.‖  Just 
as legislatures may restrict or prohibit the individual use, possession, and 
operation of arms ―whenever they shall think the good of the whole require 
it,‖131 the founders believed in unfettered governmental regulation over the 
militia that ―will be productive of the greatest public benefit.‖132  An ano-
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nymous 1789 editorial in the Independent Chronicle illustrates this very 
point by posing the following question: ―[W]hat would you think of a mili-
tia who should use their arms to oppress, terrify, plunder, and vex their 
peaceable neighbours, and then say they were armed for the common good, 
and must be free?‖133 
The question was posed to illuminate the point that the ―freedom of the 
press‖ is a right that could be regulated to protect the ―reputation,‖ ―feel-
ings,‖ and ―peace of a citizen[.]‖134  This same premise of the ―common 
good‖ holds true with the ―right to keep and bear arms‖ to effect the Consti-
tution‘s ―well-regulated militia.‖  As the anonymous writer pointed out, 
―there are laws to restrain the militia,‖ and any laws that restrict the free-
dom of the press are similar because both ―prevent the wonton injury and 
destruction of individuals‖ and ensure there is a legal ―line some where, or 
the peace of society would be destroyed by the very instrument designed to 
promote it.‖135 
CONCLUSION  
As Second Amendment jurisprudence moves forward, it is improper 
for legal commentators to claim that the history of the founding generation 
does not provide us with any historical guideposts, clues, or originalist in-
sight as to the constitutionality of modern gun control regulations or prohi-
bitions.  Restrictions on ―arms‖ date back to the beginning of our Anglo 
heritage and evolved based on the interests of the ―public good.‖  Indeed, 
the Constitution provides unalienable rights that legislatures may never in-
fringe upon.  However, in the constraints of the Second Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has only identified two ―core‖ rights136—both of which have 
a strong historical pedigree that can provide the courts with insight into the 
amendment‘s intended meaning and proper purpose. 
While modern-day gun control laws will never exactly parallel their 
eighteenth century counterparts, the founders adhered to certain philosophi-
cal and ideological restraints on ―right to arms‖ that the courts can apply to-
day.137  Perhaps most importantly, the founders saw a legal difference 
between the right to ―keep and bear arms for the common defence‖ as dis-
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tinct from other uses of arms.  Legal commentators need to recognize this 
legal distinction; for a militia, organized or unorganized, falls within a dif-
ferent subset of the law.  This distinction is not only recognized by Supreme 
Court precedent, but can be found in the text of the Constitution,138 and was 
even acknowledged by Freedmen during the tumultuous Reconstruction pe-
riod.139 
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